Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a Second Price Auction

6 Pages Posted: 10 Apr 2011

See all articles by Nicolas Jacquemet

Nicolas Jacquemet

Paris School of Economics (PSE); Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Bobert-Vincent Joulé

Universities of Marseille - University of Provence - Aix-Marseille I

Stephane Luchini

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM), EHESS

Jason F. Shogren

University of Wyoming

Date Written: April 7, 2009

Abstract

This paper considers whether earned wealth affects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.

Keywords: Auctions, Demand Revelation, Experimental Valuation, Hypothetical Bias, Earned Money

JEL Classification: C3, D1

Suggested Citation

Jacquemet, Nicolas and Joulé, Bobert-Vincent and Luchini, Stephane and Shogren, Jason F., Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a Second Price Auction (April 7, 2009). Economics Letters, Vol. 105, No. 1, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1805152

Nicolas Jacquemet (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris, 75005
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.nicolasjacquemet.com/

Bobert-Vincent Joulé

Universities of Marseille - University of Provence - Aix-Marseille I ( email )

3, avenue Robert Schuman
Aix-en-Provence, 13100
France

Stephane Luchini

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM), EHESS ( email )

Centre de la Vieille Charité
2, rue de la Charité
Marseille, 13002
France

Jason F. Shogren

University of Wyoming ( email )

Department of Economics
BU292
Laramie, WY 82071-3985
United States
307-766-5430 (Phone)
307-766-5090 (Fax)

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