Referendum Under Oath

8 Pages Posted: 10 Apr 2011

See all articles by Nicolas Jacquemet

Nicolas Jacquemet

Paris School of Economics (PSE); Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Alexander G. James

University of Wyoming - College of Business - Department of Economics and Finance

Stephane Luchini

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM), EHESS

Jason F. Shogren

University of Wyoming

Date Written: June 1, 2010

Abstract

Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that after signing an oath people are as likely to vote for a public good in a hypothetical referenda as in a real one.

Keywords: Dichotomous Choice Mechanism, Hypothetical Bias, Oath, Preference Revelation

JEL Classification: C9, H4, Q5

Suggested Citation

Jacquemet, Nicolas and James, Alexander G. and Luchini, Stephane and Shogren, Jason F., Referendum Under Oath (June 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1805162 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1805162

Nicolas Jacquemet (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris, 75005
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.nicolasjacquemet.com/

Alexander G. James

University of Wyoming - College of Business - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 3985
Laramie, WY 82071-3985
United States

Stephane Luchini

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM), EHESS ( email )

Centre de la Vieille Charité
2, rue de la Charité
Marseille, 13002
France

Jason F. Shogren

University of Wyoming ( email )

Department of Economics
BU292
Laramie, WY 82071-3985
United States
307-766-5430 (Phone)
307-766-5090 (Fax)

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