Incentives and Cooperation in Firms: Field Evidence

30 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2011

See all articles by Johannes Berger

Johannes Berger

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management

Claus Herbertz

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management

Dirk Sliwka

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: April 1, 2011

Abstract

We empirically investigate the impact of incentive scheme structure on the degree of cooperation in firms using a unique and representative data set. Combining employee survey data with detailed firm level information on the relative importance of individual, team, and company performance for compensation, we find a significant positive relation between the intensity of team incentives and several survey measures of cooperation. Moreover, higher powered team incentives are associated with lower degrees of absenteeism while this is not the case for individual incentives.

Keywords: incentives, cooperation, teams, helping effort

JEL Classification: D23, J33, M52, M54

Suggested Citation

Berger, Johannes and Herbertz, Claus and Sliwka, Dirk, Incentives and Cooperation in Firms: Field Evidence (April 1, 2011). IZA Discussion Paper No. 5618. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1806419

Johannes Berger

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management ( email )

Koln, 50923
Germany

Claus Herbertz (Contact Author)

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management ( email )

Koln, 50923
Germany

Dirk Sliwka

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management ( email )

Koln, 50923
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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