Profitable Participation: Technology Innovation as an Influence on the Ratification of Regulatory Treaties

64 Pages Posted: 12 Apr 2011  

Chris Marcoux

College of William and Mary

Johannes Urpelainen

Columbia University

Date Written: April 9, 2011

Abstract

What explains variation in the ratification of regulatory treaties? We argue that if international regulation were to create markets for new technologies, innovative companies would support the ratification of the relevant regulatory treaties. Consequently, we expect that technology innovation capabilities have a positive effect on business support for regulatory treaty ratification. We test this theory against data on the ratification of two major multilateral treaties for pesticides control, the 1998 Rotterdam Convention and the 2001 Stockholm Convention. Our case studies and quantitative analyses provide empirical evidence in support of our theory: if a country has a sizable industry capable of biotechnology innovation, it is substantially more likely to ratify each treaty than otherwise. These findings (i) demonstrate that technology innovation is a key ingredient of business support for regulatory treaty ratification, (ii) emphasize the highly contingent nature of constituency preferences for or against regulatory treaties, and (iii) underscore the general importance of technological factors for international cooperation theory.

Keywords: international cooperation, international regulation, treaty ratification, technology innovation, environmental policy

JEL Classification: F02, O33, Q20

Suggested Citation

Marcoux, Chris and Urpelainen, Johannes, Profitable Participation: Technology Innovation as an Influence on the Ratification of Regulatory Treaties (April 9, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1806495 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1806495

Chris Marcoux

College of William and Mary ( email )

P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, VA 23185
United States

Johannes Urpelainen (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~ju2178

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