Do Competition and Ownership Affect Enterprise Efficiency in the Absence of Market Institutions? Evidence after Privatization in Mongolia

38 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 1999

See all articles by James H. Anderson

James H. Anderson

World Bank - Governance Global Practice

Young Lee

University of Maryland - Center on Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS)

Peter Murrell

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 25, 1999

Abstract

Mongolia's mass privatization program was implanted in a country that lacked the very basic institutions of capitalism. This paper examines the effects of competition and ownership on the efficiency of the newly privatized enterprises, using a representative sample of enterprises and controlling for possible selection biases. Competition has quantitatively large effects, perfectly competitive firms having nearly double the efficiency of monopolies. Enterprises with residual state ownership appear to be more efficient than other enterprises, reflecting an environment where the government was pressured to focus on efficiency and institutions gave little voice to outsider owners.

JEL Classification: P0, L1, L33, 012

Suggested Citation

Anderson, James Horton and Lee, Young and Murrell, Peter, Do Competition and Ownership Affect Enterprise Efficiency in the Absence of Market Institutions? Evidence after Privatization in Mongolia (January 25, 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=180890 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.180890

James Horton Anderson

World Bank - Governance Global Practice ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN J 4-403
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-1556 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://blogs.worldbank.org/team/jim-anderson

Young Lee

University of Maryland - Center on Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS)

2105 Morrill Hall
College Park, MD 20742
United States

Peter Murrell (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-3476 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
501
Abstract Views
2,493
rank
55,247
PlumX Metrics