When Cartels Split: Roll Call Votes and Majority Factional Warfare in the Mexico City Assembly

19 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2011

See all articles by Eric Magar

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department

Date Written: March 28, 2011

Abstract

This paper reports work in progress. Procedural cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 2005) expects intra-majority party conflict in final passage votes to be reduced to a minimum. This is a consequence of agenda control by key party members. I inspect roll call voting in the 4th legislature of Mexico City's Assembly (2006-09) uncovering a frequent majority party split in the floor. Ideal point estimation reveals two lines of Assembly cleavage, one the classic left-right divide on economic issues, the other mostly related to appointments of officers at different levels. While the left-leaning PRD majority showed cohesion in the first dimension, the presence of two distinct factions is manifest in the second. The paper suggests that further research should blame rigid assembly rules combined with an unexpected defeat in the 2006 presidential race for this anomaly.

Keywords: Ideal point estimation, legislative parties, factions, procedural cartel theory

JEL Classification: D71, D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Magar, Eric, When Cartels Split: Roll Call Votes and Majority Factional Warfare in the Mexico City Assembly (March 28, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1808960 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1808960

Eric Magar (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Col. Tizapan San-Angel
Mexico City, D.F. 01000
Mexico
525556284079 (Phone)
525554904674 (Fax)

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