Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, July (2014), 6(3): 103-32

34 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2011 Last revised: 24 Nov 2014

Stefano DellaVigna

University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ruben Enikolopov

Institute of Political Economy and Governance; ICREA; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; New Economic School; Barcelona GSE

Vera Mironova

University of Maryland

Maria Petrova

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona; Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats - ICREA; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); New Economic School (NES)

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 13, 2013

Abstract

How do nationalistic media affect animosity between ethnic groups? We consider one of Europe’s deadliest conflicts since WWII: the Serbo-Croatian conflict. We show that, after a decade of peace, cross-border nationalistic Serbian radio triggers ethnic hatred towards Serbs in Croatia. Mostly attracted by non-political content, many Croats listen to Serbian public radio (intended for Serbs in Serbia) whenever signal is available. As a result, the vote for extreme nationalist parties is higher, and ethnically offensive graffiti are more common, in Croatian villages with Serbian radio reception. A laboratory experiment confirms that Serbian radio exposure causes anti-Serbian sentiment among Croats.

Keywords: mass media, persuasion, voting, nationalism, conflict

JEL Classification: J0, D0, H0, D74

Suggested Citation

DellaVigna, Stefano and Enikolopov, Ruben and Mironova, Vera and Petrova, Maria and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia (August 13, 2013). American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, July (2014), 6(3): 103-32. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1808990 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1808990

Stefano DellaVigna

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

Economics Department
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-643-0715 (Phone)
510-642-6615 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/sdellavi/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Ruben Enikolopov (Contact Author)

Institute of Political Economy and Governance ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

ICREA ( email )

Passeig Lluís Companys, 23
Barcelona, 08010
Spain

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain

New Economic School ( email )

47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Vera Mironova

University of Maryland ( email )

College Park
College Park, MD 20742
United States

Maria Petrova

New Economic School (NES) ( email )

47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats - ICREA ( email )

Passeig Lluís Companys, 23
Barcelona, 08010
Spain

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Ekaterina V. Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

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