Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China

53 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2011

See all articles by Monica Martinez-Bravo

Monica Martinez-Bravo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Gerard Padró i Miquel

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Nancy Qian

Yale University - Department of Economics

Yang Yao

Peking University - China Center for Economic Research (CCER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2011

Abstract

We use unique survey data to study whether the introduction of local elections in China made local leaders more accountable towards local constituents. We develop a simple model to predict the effects on different policies of increasing local leader accountability, taking into account that there is an autocratic upper government. We exploit variation in the timing of the top-down introduction of elections across villages to estimate the causal effects of elections and find that elections affected policy outcomes in a way that is consistent with the predicted effects of increased local leader accountability.

Suggested Citation

Martinez-Bravo, Monica and Padro i Miquel, Gerard and Qian, Nancy and Yao, Yang, Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China (April 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w16948. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1810302

Monica Martinez-Bravo (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Gerard Padro i Miquel

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Nancy Qian

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

Yang Yao

Peking University - China Center for Economic Research (CCER) ( email )

Beijing, 100871
China

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