19 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2011
Date Written: April 2011
Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Recent work on non-cooperative games shows games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a "tipping set" a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise.
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Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Heal, Geoffrey M. and Kunreuther, Howard, Tipping Climate Negotiations (April 2011). NBER Working Paper Series, Vol. w16954, pp. -, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1810308