Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1810308
 
 

References (13)



 


 



Tipping Climate Negotiations


Geoffrey M. Heal


Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Howard Kunreuther


University of Pennsylvania - Operations, Information and Decisions Department;; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

April 2011

NBER Working Paper No. w16954

Abstract:     
Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Recent work on non-cooperative games shows games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a "tipping set" a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: April 18, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Heal, Geoffrey M. and Kunreuther, Howard, Tipping Climate Negotiations (April 2011). NBER Working Paper Series, Vol. w16954, pp. -, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1810308

Contact Information

Geoffrey M. Heal (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-6459 (Phone)
212-316-9219 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/gheal/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Howard C. Kunreuther
University of Pennsylvania - Operations, Information and Decisions Department; ( email )
3730 Walnut Street
558 & 559 Jon M. Huntsman Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19104-5340
United States
212-854-0423 (Phone)
215-573-2130 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 223
Downloads: 27
References:  13