Industrial Policy and Competition

37 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2012

See all articles by Philippe Aghion

Philippe Aghion

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Mathias Dewatripont

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luosha Du

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Ann E. Harrison

University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Patrick Legros

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Northeastern University, department of economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 18, 2011

Abstract

The economic slowdown in the 70s in Latin America and Japan in the late 90s, generated a growing skepticism about the role of industrial policy in the process of economic development. Yet, new considerations have emerged over the recent period, which invite us to revisit the issue. This paper argues that sectoral state aids tend to foster productivity, productivity growth, and product innovation to a larger extent when it targets more competitive sectors and when it is not concentrated on one or a small number of firms in the sector. Using a theoretical framework in which two firms may choose either to operate in the same "higher-growth" sector or in different, "lower-growth" sector. We use a panel of medium and large Chinese enterprises for the period 1998 through 2007 to test for complementarity between competition and industrial policy. A main implication from our analysis is that the debate on industrial policy should no longer be for or against having such a policy. As it turns out, sectoral policies are being implemented in one form or another by a large number of countries worldwide, starting with China. Rather, the issue should be on how to design and govern sectoral policies in order to make them more competition-friendly and therefore more growth-enhancing.

Keywords: industrial policy, competition, application fees, intellectual property policy, patent system, innovation and productivity, renewal fees

JEL Classification: O30, O31, O38, O57

Suggested Citation

Aghion, Philippe and Dewatripont, Mathias and Du, Luosha and Harrison, Ann E. and Legros, Patrick, Industrial Policy and Competition (June 18, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1811643 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1811643

Philippe Aghion (Contact Author)

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Mathias Dewatripont

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
+32 2 650 4217/4 (Phone)
+32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Luosha Du

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Ann E. Harrison

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

Giannini Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Patrick Legros

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
+32 2 650 4219/3 (Phone)
+32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Northeastern University, department of economics ( email )

301 Lake Hall
Boston, MA 02115
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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