Optimal Sets of Candidates

19 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2011

See all articles by Johannes W. Fedderke

Johannes W. Fedderke

Pennsylvania State University - School of International Affairs

Date Written: November 2006


We consider the optimal choice set of candidates standing for elected office. The decision dimensions are in the number of candidates standing for election, and the experiential base of the candidates standing for election as measured by the length of prior experience held by the candidates and the proportion of candidates with such prior experience. We find that while there are benefits that accrue to having a larger choice, the optimal number of candidates is strictly finite. Second, to justify an increase in the optimal length of prior experience requires strong increases in the ratio of benefits that accrue from additional experience to the cost of abuse of privilege. The conditions under which an increase in the length of prior experience can be justified is where the cost associated with abuse of privilege is negligible. This would require the development of appropriate formal (legal and constitutional) and informal (civil society) institutions that ensure that abuse of office remain negligible. Finally, we allow the number of electoral candidates, the length of their prior experience, as well as the proportion of candidates with experience to vary. Under this choice problem optimal pairings of length of experience and the proportion of candidates with prior experience may not exist. Hence societies may be condemned to sub-optimality even should the political system prove to be amenable to change, rendering disaffection endemic to the political system.

Keywords: Electoral Systems, Optimal Choice Sets

JEL Classification: D7, D9, H0, H1

Suggested Citation

Fedderke, Johannes W., Optimal Sets of Candidates (November 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1812144 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1812144

Johannes W. Fedderke (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University - School of International Affairs ( email )

Lewis Katz Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sia.psu.edu/faculty/johannes_fedderke

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