Information Sharing in Credit Markets: International Evidence

39 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2011

See all articles by Tullio Jappelli

Tullio Jappelli

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Center for Studies in Economics and Finance - CSEF; CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

Marco Pagano

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF); Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: June 1999

Abstract

Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard, and can therefore increase lending and reduce default rates. We construct a new international data set on credit bureaus and public credit registers. The theoretical predictions are broadly consistent with our data. We also study why central banks often supplement private arrangements by creating public credit registers and distribution of information about borrowers` credit histories. Public intervention is more likely where creditor rights are poorly protected and private arrangements have not arisen spontaneously.

Suggested Citation

Jappelli, Tullio and Pagano, Marco, Information Sharing in Credit Markets: International Evidence (June 1999). IDB Working Paper No. 106, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1814650 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1814650

Tullio Jappelli (Contact Author)

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.csef.it/people/jappelli.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.cepr.org/researchers/details/rschcontact.asp?IDENT=106354

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Center for Studies in Economics and Finance - CSEF ( email )

Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.csef.it/people/jappelli.htm

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

Via Cintia
Complesso Monte S. Angelo
Naples, Naples 80126
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.csef.it/people/jappelli.htm

Marco Pagano

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

Via Cintia
Complesso Monte S. Angelo
Naples, Naples 80126
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Via Sallustiana, 62
Rome, 00187
Italy

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

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