Bank Relationships: Effect on the Availability and Marginal Cost of Credit for Firms in Argentina

66 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2011

See all articles by Jorge M. Streb

Jorge M. Streb

Universidad del CEMA

Javier Bolzico

Fit & Proper Consulting

Pablo Fabian Druck

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Alejandro Henke

affiliation not provided to SSRN

José Rutman

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Walter Sosa-Escudero

Universidad Nacional de La Plata - Faculty of Economics

Date Written: May 2002

Abstract

This paper provides evidence on what affects the marginal cost and availability of bank credit for firms in Argentina. We study in particular how banks use different pieces of private and public information to screen firms and overcome informational asymmetries in the credit market. While some private information, such as balance sheet data, is transferable, private information generated in relationships is not. To capture the closeness of bank relationships, we resort to the concentration of bank credit and the number of credit lines in a bank. We also consider public information available in the Central de Deudores.

Suggested Citation

Streb, Jorge Miguel and Bolzico, Javier and Druck, Pablo Fabian and Henke, Alejandro and Rutman, José and Sosa-Escudero, Walter, Bank Relationships: Effect on the Availability and Marginal Cost of Credit for Firms in Argentina (May 2002). IDB Working Paper No. 156, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1814704 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1814704

Jorge Miguel Streb (Contact Author)

Universidad del CEMA ( email )

Av. Cordoba 374
Buenos Aires, CABA
Argentina

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucema.edu.ar/u/jms/

Javier Bolzico

Fit & Proper Consulting ( email )

Pablo Fabian Druck

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Alejandro Henke

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

José Rutman

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Walter Sosa-Escudero

Universidad Nacional de La Plata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

1900 La Plata
Argentina
(541) 553-9983 (Phone)

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