Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina

60 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2011

See all articles by Juan Pablo Nicolini

Juan Pablo Nicolini

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Josefina Posadas

World Bank

Juan Sanguinetti

University of San Andres, Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Institucional (CEDI)

Pablo Sanguinetti

Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 2002

Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of fiscal performance of sub-national governments in Argentina. This will be done through analysis and examination of the overall regime of incentives, through an analysis of salient episodes of `bailout` and through cross-sectional empirical analysis. The bailout episodes to be analyzed will include mostly those that occurred in the relationship between the national and provincial governments. Of primary interest will be the process that caused the crises and how both the provinces and the federal government reacted, with an emphasis on the incentives and constraints each faced. The paper will also try to explain the actual form that the bailout takes. The empirical analysis will emphasize those determinants of bailout related to the institutional design of intergovernmental fiscal institutions. Thus, the study will have direct implications regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the current institutional framework in generating sound fiscal behavior by the different levels of government.

Suggested Citation

Nicolini, Juan Pablo and Posadas, Josefina and Sanguinetti, Juan and Sanguinetti, Pablo and Tommasi, Mariano, Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina (August 2002). IDB Working Paper No. 175, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1814725 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1814725

Juan Pablo Nicolini (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Josefina Posadas

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Juan Sanguinetti

University of San Andres, Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Institucional (CEDI) ( email )

Vita Dumas 284
(1644) Victoria, Pcia
Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires 1644
Argentina

Pablo Sanguinetti

Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

Minones 2159
1428 Buenos Aires, 1428
Argentina
(54 1) 784 0080/84 (Phone)
(54 1) 784 0089 (Fax)

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics ( email )

Vito Dumas 284
Victoria, Buenos Aires B1644BID
Argentina
+5411-4725-7020 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.udesa.edu.ar/tommasi/index.htm

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