Do Cultural Differences Between Contracting Parties Matter? Evidence from Syndicated Bank Loans

Management Science, Forthcoming

Posted: 22 Apr 2011

See all articles by Mariassunta Giannetti

Mariassunta Giannetti

Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swedish House of Finance

Yishay Yafeh

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: April, 19 2011

Abstract

We investigate whether cultural differences between professional decision-makers affect financial contracts in a large dataset of international syndicated bank loans. We find that more culturally distant lead banks offer borrowers smaller loans at a higher interest rate and are more likely to require third-party guarantees. These effects do not disappear following repeated interaction between borrower and lender and are economically sizable: A one-standard-deviation increase in cultural distance, approximately the distance between Canada and the U.S. or between Japan and South Korea, is associated with a 6.5 basis point higher loan spread; the loan spread increases by about 23 basis points if the bank-firm match involves culturally more distant parties, for example, from Japan and the U.S. We also find that cultural differences not only affect the relation between borrower and lender, but also hamper risk sharing between participant banks and culturally distant lead banks.

Keywords: Financial contracts, risk sharing, behavioral bias, culture

JEL Classification: G3, G21, F4

Suggested Citation

Giannetti, Mariassunta and Yafeh, Yishay, Do Cultural Differences Between Contracting Parties Matter? Evidence from Syndicated Bank Loans (April, 19 2011). Management Science, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1815157

Mariassunta Giannetti (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 736 9607 (Phone)
+46 8 312 327 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/mariassuntagiannetti/Home

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Yishay Yafeh

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem 91905
Israel
+972 2 588 3081 (Phone)
+972 2 588 1341 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://bschool.huji.ac.il/facultye/yafeh/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
562
PlumX Metrics