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How Nations Share

Allison Christians

McGill University - Faculty of Law

April 19, 2011

Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 87, 2011
Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1159

Every nation has an interest in sharing the gains they help create by participating in globalization. If governments fail to claim an adequate share of these gains, they will be forced to look ever more intensely to personal taxes on their own already-burdened citizens. Yet because of the structure of law and the mechanisms of legal decision-making in this area, it is all but impossible to observe how, and how much, governments are in fact claiming. This article shows that to date, excessive protection of taxpayer confidentiality has led to obscurity and minimization of hard law and a network of abstraction through soft law as its faulty and inadequate replacement. It argues that this paradigm serves the political goals of special interest groups at a high social cost. It concludes that at a time when national economic and political fortunes are experiencing high stress, uncertainty and volatility, we need much better information about how international tax law develops and works in practice.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: international law, diplomacy, dispute resolution, tax treaties, competent authority, tax policy, profit allocation, transfer pricing, soft law, hard law, global governance

JEL Classification: E63, H2, F02, H87, K33, K34, K41, N40, P45, H10, H20, H11, H21, H26, H87, F00, F20, F23, F50, F51, F

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Date posted: April 21, 2011 ; Last revised: April 24, 2011

Suggested Citation

Christians, Allison, How Nations Share (April 19, 2011). Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 87, 2011; Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1159. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1815305 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1815305

Contact Information

Allison Christians (Contact Author)
McGill University - Faculty of Law ( email )
1001 Sherbrooke St. W
Montreal, Quebec H3A 1G5
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