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Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality

41 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2011  

Pierre M. Picard

Centre de Recherche en Économie Appliquée (CREA); Universite du Luxembourg

Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie

Free University of Brussels - Solvay Business School; Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: April 2011

Abstract

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent systems from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination processes. Various objectives of patent offices' governors are considered. We show that the quality of the patent system is maximal for the patent office that maximises either the social welfare or its own profit. Quality is lower for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of patent applications and even smaller for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of granted patents. A labor union improves examination quality and may compensate for the potentialy inappropriate objectives of patent office management.

Keywords: intellectual property, Patent system, public firm organization, quality

JEL Classification: L30, O30, O31, O34, O38

Suggested Citation

Picard, Pierre M. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality (April 2011). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8338. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1815813

Pierre M. Picard (Contact Author)

Centre de Recherche en Économie Appliquée (CREA) ( email )

Campus Limpertsberg
162A, avenue de la Faïencerie
Luxembourg, 1511
Luxembourg

Universite du Luxembourg

L-1511 Luxembourg
Luxembourg

Bruno Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie

Free University of Brussels - Solvay Business School

50 Avenue Roosevelt
Brussels 1050
Belgium

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt 50
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

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