Levinasian Ethics and Animal Rights

16 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2011

See all articles by Jonathan Crowe

Jonathan Crowe

University of Southern Queensland - School of Law and Justice

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

What can we say, in good faith, about the moral status of animals? This article explores the above question through the prism of Emmanuel Levinas’ theory of ethics. I begin by examining the ambiguous position of non-human animals in Levinas’ writings. I argue that Levinas’ theory is best read as suggesting that nonhumans present claims for recognition as ethical beings, but that these demands have a different character to those presented by humans. I then explore the implications of Levinas’ view of ethics for the structure of moral reasoning. I contend that Levinas’ theory yields a conception of moral reasoning as reflective, good faith engagement with primordial social judgements of ethical significance. In the final part of the article, I suggest that it is both possible and constructive to thematise the ethical claims of non-human animals in the language of rights. Indeed, from a Levinasian perspective, animal rights might properly be viewed as a model for the notion of human rights, since they capture the essential asymmetry of the ethical encounter.

Suggested Citation

Crowe, Jonathan, Levinasian Ethics and Animal Rights (2008). Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, Vol. 26, p. 313, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1816565

Jonathan Crowe (Contact Author)

University of Southern Queensland - School of Law and Justice ( email )

West Street
Toowoomba, Queensland 4350
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://jonathancrowe.org/

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