An Index of Fiscal Democracy
MPIfG Working Paper 10/3
17 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2011
Date Written: April 1, 2010
Abstract
Over the past four decades, the accumulation of policy legacies and public debt has led to a decline in fiscal flexibility in Germany and the United States. By applying an index of fiscal democracy to Germany, the paper illustrates the associated shrinkage of democratic control over budget priorities and compares the developments in both countries.
In den vergangenen vier Jahrzehnten hat die Anhäufung politischer Erblasten und öffentlicher Verschuldung sowohl in Deutschland als auch in den USA zu einer Abnahme fiskalischer Flexibilität geführt. Anhand eines Fiscal Democracy Index für Deutschland schildert der Aufsatz die damit einhergehende Verringerung demokratischer Kontrolle budgetärer Prioritäten und vergleicht die Entwicklungen in beiden Ländern.
Keywords: fiscal policies
JEL Classification: H3
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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