Redistributional Preferences and Imposed Institutions

35 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2011

See all articles by Alberto Chong

Alberto Chong

University of Ottawa

Mark Gradstein

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: October 2006

Abstract

To what extent do imposed institutions shape preferences? We consider this issue by comparing the market-versus-state attitudes of respondents from a capitalist country, Finland, and an ex-communist group of Baltic countries, and by arguing that the period of communist rule can be viewed as an experiment in institutional imposition. We find that, consistent with some earlier related work, citizens from ex-communist countries tend to be more supportive of state ownership than respondents from capitalist economies. However, they also favor increasing inequality and competition as the means to enhance incentives. We conclude that, in some important relevant dimensions, institutional imposition (which lasted for about 50 years) had a limited effect on preferences. The lessons for Latin America are straightforward.

Suggested Citation

Chong, Alberto and Gradstein, Mark, Redistributional Preferences and Imposed Institutions (October 2006). IDB Working Paper No. 483, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1820056 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1820056

Alberto Chong (Contact Author)

University of Ottawa ( email )

2292 Edwin Crescent
Ottawa, Ontario K2C 1H7
Canada

Mark Gradstein

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+97 2 8647 2288 (Phone)
+97 2 8647 2941 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Germany

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

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Washington, DC 20433
United States

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