Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?

48 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2011

See all articles by Carlos Scartascini

Carlos Scartascini

Research Department - Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics

Ernesto Stein

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2008

Abstract

Veto player theory argues that a higher number of veto players lowers the likelihood of change; in turn, policies that do not change help to sustain commitments but may prevent adaptation to changing circumstances. This paper challenges that claim by arguing that policy stability does not necessarily mean lower policy adaptability. If policymaking takes place over time with actors interacting repeatedly, more cooperative polities might be able to achieve both objectives at once, and a higher number of veto players might even favor intertemporal cooperation.

Suggested Citation

Scartascini, Carlos G. and Tommasi, Mariano and Stein, Ernesto Hugo, Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work? (September 2008). IDB Working Paper No. 545, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1820933 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1820933

Carlos G. Scartascini (Contact Author)

Research Department - Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )

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Washington, DC 20577
United States
2026231963 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cscartascini.org

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics ( email )

Vito Dumas 284
Victoria, Buenos Aires B1644BID
Argentina
+5411-4725-7020 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.udesa.edu.ar/tommasi/index.htm

Ernesto Hugo Stein

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )

1300 New York Avenue, NW
Research Department
Washington, DC 20577
United States

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