Hush Money

19 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 1999

See all articles by Andrew F. Daughety

Andrew F. Daughety

Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University - Law School

Jennifer F. Reinganum

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics; Vanderbilt University - Law School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 1999

Abstract

We provide a simple incomplete-information model wherein an initially uninformed plaintiff makes a menu of settlement demands (one of which involves confidentiality) of the informed defendant. The defendant is informed about both his culpability in the harm suffered by the current plaintiff and the existence of other plaintiffs. The possibility that there are other plaintiffs the defendant might face improves the current plaintiff's bargaining position, as the likelihood of follow-on suits depends upon the visibility of the outcome of the case. For this reason, the defendant may be willing to be "hush money."

Suggested Citation

Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F., Hush Money (1999). RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 30,(4), pp. 661-78, Winter 1999. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=182375 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.182375

Andrew F. Daughety

Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University ( email )

PMB 351819
2301 Vanderbilt Place
Nashville, TN 37235-1819
United States
615-322-3453 (Phone)
615-343-8495 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://my.vanderbilt.edu/andrewdaughety/

Vanderbilt University - Law School

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

Jennifer F. Reinganum (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
615-322-2937 (Phone)
615-343-8495 (Fax)

Vanderbilt University - Law School

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
77
Abstract Views
1,283
rank
198,530
PlumX Metrics