Competition for the International Pool of Talent: Education Policy and Student Mobility

33 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2011

See all articles by Alexander Haupt

Alexander Haupt

University of Plymouth - Plymouth Business School; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Tim Krieger

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics

Thomas Lange

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Date Written: April 27, 2011

Abstract

This paper presents a model of two countries competing for a pool of students from the rest of the world (ROW). In equilibrium, one country offers high educational quality for high tuition fees, while the other country provides a low quality and charges low fees. The quality in the high quality country, the tuition fees, and the quality and tuition fee differential between the countries increase with the income prospects in ROW and the number of international students. Higher stay rates of foreign students lead to more ambiguous results. In particular, an increase in educational quality can be accompanied by a decline in tuition fees. Furthermore, international competition for students can give rise to a brain gain in ROW.

Keywords: higher education, student mobility, vertical quality differentiation, return migration, brain gain

JEL Classification: H870, F220, I280

Suggested Citation

Haupt, Alexander and Krieger, Tim and Lange, Thomas, Competition for the International Pool of Talent: Education Policy and Student Mobility (April 27, 2011). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3421. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1824230

Alexander Haupt

University of Plymouth - Plymouth Business School ( email )

Mast House
Plymouth, Devon PL4 8AA
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Tim Krieger (Contact Author)

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics ( email )

University of Freiburg
Wilhelmstr. 1b
Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wguth.uni-freiburg.de

Thomas Lange

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics ( email )

Box D133
D-78457 Konstanz
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
81679 Munich
Germany

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