A Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof and No-Vetoer Rules in the Multi-Object Choice Model
20 Pages Posted: 11 May 2011 Last revised: 28 Feb 2013
Date Written: March 23, 2011
Following Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer.
Keywords: social choice, public decision making, voting by committees, generalized median voter scheme, separable prefernce
JEL Classification: C72, D71, H41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation