A Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof and No-Vetoer Rules in the Multi-Object Choice Model

20 Pages Posted: 11 May 2011 Last revised: 28 Feb 2013

See all articles by Kentaro Hatsumi

Kentaro Hatsumi

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research

Dolors Berga-Colom

University of Girona - Department of Economics

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: March 23, 2011

Abstract

Following Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer.

Keywords: social choice, public decision making, voting by committees, generalized median voter scheme, separable prefernce

JEL Classification: C72, D71, H41

Suggested Citation

Hatsumi, Kentaro and Berga-Colom, Dolors and Serizawa, Shigehiro, A Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof and No-Vetoer Rules in the Multi-Object Choice Model (March 23, 2011). ISER Discussion Paper No. 809, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1824931 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1824931

Kentaro Hatsumi

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research ( email )

Yoshida-Honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8501
JAPAN

Dolors Berga-Colom

University of Girona - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus de Montilivi s/n
Girona, Girona 17071
Spain

Shigehiro Serizawa (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8558 (Phone)
+81 6 6878 2766 (Fax)

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