American Review of Law and Economics, Forthcoming
36 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2011 Last revised: 18 Jan 2014
Date Written: October 30, 2010
We investigate the conditions for the desirability of exclusive intellectual property rights for innovators, as opposed to weak rights allowing for some degree of imitation and ex-post competition. The comparison between the two alternatives reduces to a specific "ratio test," which suggests that strong, exclusive IP rights are preferable when competition from potential imitators is weak, the innovation attracts large R&D investments, and research spill-overs are small.
Keywords: innovation, exclusive rights, patents, trade secrets, spill-overs
JEL Classification: K1, D4, L4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Denicolò, Vincenzo and Franzoni, Luigi A., Weak Intellectual Property Rights, Research Spill-Overs and The Incentive to Innovate (October 30, 2010). American Review of Law and Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1825045