The Pollution Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions: Asymmetry, Disaggregation, and Multilateralism

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 11-073/2

44 Pages Posted: 2 May 2011

See all articles by Julia Swart

Julia Swart

Utrecht School of Economics

Charles van Marrewijk

Utrecht University - School of Economics

Date Written: April 28, 2011

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) on Carbon Dioxide emissions. Carbon Dioxide is the main anthropogenic greenhouse gas. A global problem that requires a multilateral solution. To take this into account we introduce an institutional variable, which captures the degree of international commitment to decrease and control the degradation of the environment.

We test three hypotheses and find: (i) Asymmetry: the development level of the target country determines the direction of the effect of M&As on CO2 emissions; (ii) Sector-specific impact: pollution intensive sectors have an impact on CO2 emissions, whereas other sectors do not; (iii) Multilateralism: multilateral agreements are important to reduce CO2 emissions.

Keywords: Carbon Dioxide Emission, Mergers and Acquisitions, Foreign Direct Investment, Institution, Environment

JEL Classification: F23, Q55, Q56

Suggested Citation

Swart, Julia and van Marrewijk, Charles, The Pollution Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions: Asymmetry, Disaggregation, and Multilateralism (April 28, 2011). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 11-073/2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1825063 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1825063

Julia Swart (Contact Author)

Utrecht School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, +31 30 253 7373 3584 EC
Netherlands

Charles Van Marrewijk

Utrecht University - School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, 3584 EC
Netherlands
*31-(0)30-2539810 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.charlesvanmarrewijk.nl

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
60
Abstract Views
469
rank
356,789
PlumX Metrics