Immigration Policy and Counterterrorism

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2011-012B

44 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2011 Last revised: 15 Jun 2012

See all articles by Subhayu Bandyopadhyay

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - Research Division; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; West Virginia University

Todd M. Sandler

University of Texas at Dallas - School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, Department of Economics & Finance

Date Written: February 2012

Abstract

A terrorist group, based in a developing (host) country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to conduct attacks in that nation and abroad. The host nation chooses proactive countermeasures. Moreover, a targeted developed nation decides its optimal mix of immigration quotas and defensive counterterrorism actions. Even though proactive measures in the host country may not curb terrorism directed at it, it may still be advantageous in terms of national income. Increases in the unskilled immigration quota augment terrorism against the developed country. By contrast, increases in the skilled immigration quota can reduce terrorism in the developed country if skilled migrants have a small marginal impact on terrorism there. When the developed country assumes a leadership role, it strategically should reduce its skilled immigration quota to induce more proactive measures in the host developing country.

Keywords: Transnational terrorism, immigration, counterterrorism policy, developing country, externalities

JEL Classification: F22, O10, D74

Suggested Citation

Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu and Sandler, Todd M., Immigration Policy and Counterterrorism (February 2012). Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2011-012B. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1825402 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1825402

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - Research Division ( email )

411 Locust St
PO Box 442
St. Louis, MO 63011
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

West Virginia University ( email )

Morgantown, WV 26506-6025
United States
304-293-7879 (Phone)
304-293-7061 (Fax)

Todd M. Sandler

University of Texas at Dallas - School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

Richardson, TX 75083
United States

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