The Awarding of Public Works in Italy: An Analysis of the Mechanisms for the Selection of Contractors
44 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2011 Last revised: 11 May 2011
Date Written: December 16, 2010
Despite successive reforms, public procurement in Italy is still highly fragmented and vulnerable to collusion, corruption and ex-post renegotiation. Other defects are found in the planning stages of the works. These problems are due in part to the regulations on the awarding of public works contracts, which do not guarantee the correct functioning of the selection mechanisms. Indications from the economic literature and international comparisons suggest a series of possible improvements: i) the elimination of automatic exclusion mechanisms for anomalous tenders (which would reduce the risk of collusion between bidders); ii) the centralization of assessments of anomalous offers under the responsibility of larger adjudicating authorities, with an increase in the surety guarantees provided by the winner, to reduce the risk of subsequent renegotiations; iii) stronger anti-corruption measures; iv) more standardized planning and, for the more complex auctions, competitive dialogue.
Keywords: Infrastructure, Auctions, Regulation
JEL Classification: D44, H57, K23, L22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation