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An Experimental Investigation of Article 82 Rebate Schemes

Competition Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 1-31, 2006

30 Pages Posted: 2 May 2011 Last revised: 5 May 2011

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods; NERA Economic Consulting

Martin Beckenkamp

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: May 1, 2011

Abstract

We conduct an experiment to test standard theoretical predictions concerning switching behavior in a rebate and a discount scheme. Beyond theoretical expectations we find that rebate and discount schemes exert a significant attraction that enhances the potentially exclusionary effect of the schemes. From a competition policy perspective this is an important result because it emphasizes that it may be crucial to analyze to what extent firms deviate predictably from decision patterns prescribed by standard economic theory. Competition policy cannot afford to neglect the possibility of boundedly rational firms deviating systematically from standard theoretical predictions.

Keywords: rebates, discounts, antitrust, Article 102, Article 82, experiment, behavioral economics, competition policy

Suggested Citation

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. and Beckenkamp, Martin, An Experimental Investigation of Article 82 Rebate Schemes (May 1, 2011). Competition Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 1-31, 2006 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1827667

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud (Contact Author)

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Défense
Paris, La Défense Cedex, 92044
France

NERA Economic Consulting ( email )

1166 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
United States

Martin Beckenkamp

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, DE
Germany

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