Experimental Economics and Competition Policy: Unilateral and Coordinated Effects in Competition Games

European Competition Law Review (ECLR), 2008, 29(7), p. 408-417.

11 Pages Posted: 18 May 2011

See all articles by Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

ABC economics; IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods

Daniel Wiesen

University of Cologne

Kay Parplies

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: May 1, 2011

Abstract

The article introduces experimental economics as a teaching tool and as an analytical instrument in a competition policy context. Based on experimental data from two training sessions in two different competition authorities, the advantages of an experimental approach in conveying an intuitive insight into some of the most fundamental economic concepts of relevance in a competition law context are discussed. Furthermore the article discusses the analytical value of the approach in the analysis of competition cases and in particular its value in co-ordinated effects cases. From the perspective of experimental economics, an exclusive focus on game theoretic criteria, as for instance in the Airtours criteria, may result in enforcement gaps as the stability of collusion is underestimated.

Suggested Citation

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. and Wiesen, Daniel and Parplies, Kay, Experimental Economics and Competition Policy: Unilateral and Coordinated Effects in Competition Games (May 1, 2011). European Competition Law Review (ECLR), 2008, 29(7), p. 408-417. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1827670

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud (Contact Author)

ABC economics ( email )

Berlin, 10115
Germany
10115 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ABCecon.com

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Défense
Paris, La Défense Cedex, 92044
France

Daniel Wiesen

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

Kay Parplies

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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