Motivating Environmental Action in a Pluralistic Regulatory Environment

Law and Society Review, 2012

51 Pages Posted: 11 May 2011 Last revised: 26 Dec 2015

Yuval Feldman

Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law

Oren Perez

Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law

Date Written: December 21, 2011

Abstract

In designing a recycling policy, the regulator must choose between multiple instruments. Our study seeks to address the linkage between the choice of regulatory instruments and institutional frameworks, people’s intrinsic motivation, and various attitudinal measures. We examined the behavioral repercussions of several instruments that are used widely in recycling regulation, using an experimental survey on a representative sample of the Israeli population (n=1,800 participants). Our findings suggest that the design of recycling policies should be sensitive to the framing effects of varied regulatory instruments and to the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on the desirability and efficacy of the law. In particular, we pointed out the potential regulatory advantage of using deposit schemes over other instruments and of using private organizations as regulatory agents. Drawing on these findings, we discuss the potential value of using differentiated regulatory policies to provide incentives for recycling in societies characterized by broad heterogeneity in levels of intrinsic motivation.

Keywords: Compliance, Environmental, Recycling, Crowding Out, Framing, Incentives, Intrinsic Motivation

JEL Classification: K32, K42

Suggested Citation

Feldman, Yuval and Perez, Oren, Motivating Environmental Action in a Pluralistic Regulatory Environment (December 21, 2011). Law and Society Review, 2012 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1828789 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1828789

Yuval Feldman (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Faculty of Law
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel

Oren Perez

Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Faculty of Law
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel
+972-3-5317798 (Phone)
+972-3-5351856 (Fax)

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