Indexing and Active Fund Management: International Evidence

73 Pages Posted: 3 May 2011 Last revised: 6 Jan 2015

See all articles by Martijn Cremers

Martijn Cremers

University of Notre Dame

Miguel A. Ferreira

Nova School of Business and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Pedro Matos

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Laura T. Starks

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 5, 2015

Abstract

We examine the relation between indexing and active management in the mutual fund industry worldwide. Explicit indexing and closet indexing by active funds are associated with countries’ regulatory and financial market environments. We find that actively managed funds are more active and charge lower fees when they face more competitive pressure from low-cost explicitly indexed funds. A quasi-natural experiment using the exogenous variation in indexed funds generated by the passage of pension laws supports a causal interpretation of the results. Moreover, the average alpha generated by active management is higher in countries with more explicit indexing and lower in countries with more closet indexing. Overall, our evidence suggests that explicit indexing improves competition in the mutual fund industry.

Keywords: Mutual funds, Active management, Index funds, Exchange-traded funds, Competition, Fees, Performance

JEL Classification: G15, G18, G23

Suggested Citation

Cremers, K. J. Martijn and Ferreira, Miguel Almeida and Matos, Pedro and Starks, Laura T., Indexing and Active Fund Management: International Evidence (January 5, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1830207 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1830207

K. J. Martijn Cremers (Contact Author)

University of Notre Dame ( email )

P.O. Box 399
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0399
United States

Miguel Almeida Ferreira

Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

Campus de Campolide
Lisbon, 1099-032
Portugal

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Pedro Matos

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )

University of Virginia
P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States
434 243 8998 (Phone)
434 924 0726 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.darden.virginia.edu/faculty-research/directory/pedro-matos/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Laura T. Starks

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )

Red McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-5899 (Phone)
512-471-5073 (Fax)

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