Is Power More Evenly Balanced in Poor Households?

43 Pages Posted: 10 May 2011

See all articles by Helene Couprie

Helene Couprie

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Eugenio Peluso

University of Verona - Department of Economics

Alain Trannoy

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)

Date Written: December 2009

Abstract

The structure of intra-household allocation is crucial to know whether a transfer from a rich household to a poor one translates into a transfer from a rich individual to a poor one. If rich households are more unequal than poor ones, then a progressive transfer among households reduces intra-household inequality, hence inequality among individuals. More specifically, two conditions have to be satisfied for extending Generalized Lorenz judgments from household level to individual one. The fraction of the coupleís expenditures devoted to goods jointly consumed should decrease at the margin with the coupleís income as well as the part of private expenditure devoted to the disadvantaged individual. This double concavity condition is non-parametrically tested on the French Household Expenditure Survey (2000). It is not rejected by the data and support the view that power is more evenly distributed in poor households.

Keywords: Lorenz comparisons, intra-household inequality, sharing functions, non-parametric concavity test

JEL Classification: D63, D13, C14

Suggested Citation

Couprie, Helene and Peluso, Eugenio and Trannoy, Alain, Is Power More Evenly Balanced in Poor Households? (December 2009). Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 94, pp. 493-507. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1831166

Helene Couprie

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Eugenio Peluso (Contact Author)

University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )

Via dell'Artigliere, 8
37129 Verona
Italy

Alain Trannoy

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) ( email )

54, boulevard Raspail
Paris, 75006
France

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