Cartels in the European Union: Procedural Fairness for Defendants and Claimants

Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2011

Fordham Competition Law Institute, 2010

47 Pages Posted: 5 May 2011

See all articles by David G. Anderson

David G. Anderson

University of Aberdeen

Rachel Cuff

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: September 1, 2010

Abstract

This paper explores current procedural and structural issues regarding anti-cartel enforcement and antitrust damages actions in the EU. From the point of view of defendants in cartel investigations, it first looks at concerns regarding the procedural detail of the investigative process, and in particular the increasing impact of human rights arguments. It then focuses on more overarching concerns such as the operation of the European Commission's leniency and settlement regimes, before considering fundamental structural issues such as the broad role played by the European Commission in EU antitrust enforcement. The final section of the paper considers the debate from the point of view of third-party claimants for damages, assessing the obstacles to effective damages actions in the EU and considering the possibilities for synergies between the public and private enforcement regimes.

Keywords: Cartels, antitrust, damages actions, leniency, immunity, fines, settlement, inspection, dawn raid, human rights

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L40, L41, L49

Suggested Citation

Anderson, David G. and Cuff, Rachel, Cartels in the European Union: Procedural Fairness for Defendants and Claimants (September 1, 2010). Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2011, Fordham Competition Law Institute, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1831446

David G. Anderson

University of Aberdeen ( email )

Dunbar Street
Aberdeen, Scotland AB24 3QY
United Kingdom

Rachel Cuff (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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