An Economic Argument for Electronic Privacy

Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, Vol. 7, 2011

39 Pages Posted: 9 May 2011

See all articles by Jake Spratt

Jake Spratt

University of Denver Sturm College of Law

Date Written: May 9, 2010

Abstract

This Article proposes an economic framework with which to analyze the U.S.’s electronic privacy laws in the context of international privacy standards. A key assumption is that electronic privacy generally exists in tension with the speed and convenience of e-commerce: if privacy protections are too strong, e-commerce will suffer. At the same time, however, this Article shows that consumers expect a certain basic level of privacy when they conduct electronic transactions. A government that fails to provide this certain level of privacy effectively weakens the e-commerce industry. This Article concludes the United States has failed to guarantee sufficient privacy protections and that, by learning from the E.U. and Canada, the U.S. can increase both personal privacy and the effectiveness of e-commerce by enacting comprehensive electronic privacy laws.

Keywords: privacy, electronic privacy, privacy laws, law and economics

Suggested Citation

Spratt, Jake, An Economic Argument for Electronic Privacy (May 9, 2010). Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, Vol. 7, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1831905

Jake Spratt (Contact Author)

University of Denver Sturm College of Law ( email )

2255 E. Evans. Ave.
# 465A
Denver, CO 80208-0600
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
80
Abstract Views
544
rank
303,195
PlumX Metrics