Walrasian Equilibrium in Large, Quasilinear Markets

Theoretical Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 281-290, May 2013, DOI: 10.3982/TE1060

10 Pages Posted: 9 May 2011 Last revised: 19 May 2013

See all articles by Eduardo M. Azevedo

Eduardo M. Azevedo

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

E. Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects; Plurality Institute; GETTING-Plurality Research Network

Alexander White

Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management

Date Written: April 13, 2012

Abstract

In an economy with indivisible goods, a continuum of agents and quasilinear utility, we show that equilibrium exists regardless of the nature of agents' preferences over bundles. This contrasts with results for economies with a finite number of agents, which require restrictions on preferences (such as substitutability) to guarantee existence. When the distribution of preferences has full support, equilibrium prices are unique.

Available at http://econtheory.org. DOI: 10.3982/TE1060

Keywords: Walrasian equilibrium, quasilinear utility, indivisible goods, continuum economies, complementary preferences

JEL Classification: D51

Suggested Citation

Azevedo, Eduardo M. and Weyl, Eric Glen and White, Alexander, Walrasian Equilibrium in Large, Quasilinear Markets (April 13, 2012). Theoretical Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 281-290, May 2013, DOI: 10.3982/TE1060, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1831944 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1831944

Eduardo M. Azevedo

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
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HOME PAGE: http://www.eduardoMazevedo.com

Eric Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects ( email )

11 Ellsworth Ave, #2
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
8579984513 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com

Plurality Institute ( email )

GETTING-Plurality Research Network ( email )

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Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Alexander White (Contact Author)

Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management ( email )

Mailbox A-44
Weilun Building
Beijing, 100084
China

HOME PAGE: http://alex-white.net

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