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When Overconfident Traders Meet Feedback Traders

45 Pages Posted: 16 May 2011  

Laurent Germain

Toulouse University, Toulouse Business School

Fabrice Rousseau

National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Department of Economics

Herve Boco

Toulouse Business School

Date Written: September 2010

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a model in which overconfident market participants and rational speculators trade against trend-chasers. We show that the growth and the burst of a financial bubble stem from positive feedback trading. However, the presence of overconfident traders and the risk aversion of the informed speculators enhance the strength of bubbles (creation and burst). The positive feedback trading enhances the negative serial correlation of prices and the volatility of prices. We show that positive feedback traders destabilize prices more than their overconfident opponents. Generally, overconfidence increases the volatility of prices and worsens the market efficiency. But, we show that in the presence of positive feedback trading, overconfidence improves the market efficiency and dampens the excess volatility. When negative feedback traders are present most of the comparative statics are reversed. We obtain that negative feedback traders can earn positive expected profit when their number is low enough.

Keywords: Overconfidence, Positive feedback trading, Bubbles, Excess volatility, Market efficiency.

JEL Classification: D43, D82, G14, G24

Suggested Citation

Germain, Laurent and Rousseau, Fabrice and Boco, Herve, When Overconfident Traders Meet Feedback Traders (September 2010). International Conference of the French Finance Association (AFFI), May 11-13, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1833436 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1833436

Laurent Germain (Contact Author)

Toulouse University, Toulouse Business School ( email )

20, bd Lascrosses
Toulouse, 31000
France

Fabrice Rousseau

National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Department of Economics ( email )

County Kildare
Ireland
(33) + 5 63026345 (Phone)
(33) + 5 63644767 (Fax)

Herve Boco

Toulouse Business School ( email )

20 Boulevard Lascrosses
Toulouse, 31068
France

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