Merger Negotiations with Stock Market Feedback
63 Pages Posted: 10 May 2011 Last revised: 6 Dec 2013
Date Written: June 8, 2013
Do pre-offer target stock price runups increase bidder takeover costs? We present model-based tests of this issue assuming runups are caused by signals that inform investors about potential takeover synergies. Rational deal anticipation implies a relation between target runups and markups (offer value less the runup) that is greater than minus one-for-one and inherently nonlinear. If merger negotiations force bidders to raise the offer with the runup --- a costly feedback loop where bidders pay twice for anticipated target synergies --- markups become strictly increasing in runups. Large-sample tests support rational deal anticipation in runups while strongly rejecting the costly feedback loop.
Keywords: Merger negotiations, market feedback loop, takeover bid, offer price markup, target runup, rational bidding, market efficiency, nonlinear test
JEL Classification: G3, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation