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Do Soccer Players Play the Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium?

24 Pages Posted: 11 May 2011  

Ofer H. Azar

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business and Management

Michael Bar Eli

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Date Written: May 10, 2011

Abstract

Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is a commonly-used solution concept in game-theoretic models in various fields in economics, management, and other disciplines, but the experimental results whether the MSNE predicts well actual play in games is mixed. Consequently, evidence for naturally-occurring games in which the MSNE predicts the outcome well is of great importance, as it can justify the vast use of MSNE in models. The game between the kicker and goalkeeper in soccer penalty kicks is a real-world game that can be used to examine the application of the MSNE concept or its accuracy because payoffs are a common knowledge, the players have huge incentives to play correctly, the game is simple enough to analyze, its Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies, and players' actions can be observed. We collected and analyzed data on the direction of kicks and jumps in penalty kicks in various top leagues and tournaments. Our analysis suggests that the MSNE predictions are the closest to the actual sample data, even though some other prediction methods use information on the marginal distribution of kicks or jumps whereas the MSNE does not.

Keywords: Soccer, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, MSNE, sports, football, penalty kicks

JEL Classification: C72, C93, L83

Suggested Citation

Azar, Ofer H. and Bar Eli, Michael, Do Soccer Players Play the Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium? (May 10, 2011). Applied Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1837651

Ofer H. Azar (Contact Author)

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 653
Beer-Sheva, 84105
Israel
+972 8 6472675 (Phone)
+972 8 6477691 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.oferazar.com

Michael Bar Eli

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev ( email )

P.O. Box 653
Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel

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