ANTIBIOTIC POLITICES: CONTROLLING HOSPITAL-ASSOCIATED INFECTION, Ian M. Gould, Jos van der Meer, eds., Springer, 2011
23 Pages Posted: 20 May 2011
Date Written: May 11, 2011
The U.S. Medicare program reimburses only for discrete treatments of individuals with infections, but fails to pay for infection control or antibiotic stewardship more generally. By focusing solely on discrete hospitals and patients, Medicare ignores the larger epidemiological reality - that hospitals, nursing homes and other institutions operate within a germ shed. Under current Medicare rules, institutions that invest in infection control or antibiotic stewardship, may actually lose money and benefit rival firms in the market. In effect, current Medicare rules subsidize MRSA pollution. Worse yet, Medicare rules block potentially efficient Coasian contracts to promote private coordination within germ sheds.
Keywords: antibiotic, infection, hospital, fraud and abuse
JEL Classification: I18, K19, K23, K29, K32, K39
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Outterson, Kevin and Yevtukhova, Olga, Germ Shed Management in the United States (May 11, 2011). ANTIBIOTIC POLITICES: CONTROLLING HOSPITAL-ASSOCIATED INFECTION, Ian M. Gould, Jos van der Meer, eds., Springer, 2011; Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1838444