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Germ Shed Management in the United States

ANTIBIOTIC POLITICES: CONTROLLING HOSPITAL-ASSOCIATED INFECTION, Ian M. Gould, Jos van der Meer, eds., Springer, 2011

Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-19

23 Pages Posted: 20 May 2011  

Kevin Outterson

Boston University School of Law

Olga Yevtukhova

Boston University - School of Public Health

Date Written: May 11, 2011

Abstract

The U.S. Medicare program reimburses only for discrete treatments of individuals with infections, but fails to pay for infection control or antibiotic stewardship more generally. By focusing solely on discrete hospitals and patients, Medicare ignores the larger epidemiological reality - that hospitals, nursing homes and other institutions operate within a germ shed. Under current Medicare rules, institutions that invest in infection control or antibiotic stewardship, may actually lose money and benefit rival firms in the market. In effect, current Medicare rules subsidize MRSA pollution. Worse yet, Medicare rules block potentially efficient Coasian contracts to promote private coordination within germ sheds.

Keywords: antibiotic, infection, hospital, fraud and abuse

JEL Classification: I18, K19, K23, K29, K32, K39

Suggested Citation

Outterson, Kevin and Yevtukhova, Olga, Germ Shed Management in the United States (May 11, 2011). ANTIBIOTIC POLITICES: CONTROLLING HOSPITAL-ASSOCIATED INFECTION, Ian M. Gould, Jos van der Meer, eds., Springer, 2011; Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1838444

Kevin Outterson (Contact Author)

Boston University School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Olga Yevtukhova

Boston University - School of Public Health ( email )

715 Albany Street
Boston, MA 02118
United States

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