More Stringent BITs, Less Ambiguous Effects on FDI? Not a Bit!

Kiel Working Paper No. 1621

14 Pages Posted: 12 May 2011

See all articles by Axel Berger

Axel Berger

German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)

Matthias Busse

Ruhr-University Bochum; HWWI - Hamburg Institute of International Economics

Peter Nunnenkamp

University of Kiel

Martin Roy

World Trade Organization (WTO) - Trade in Services Division

Date Written: April 1, 2010

Abstract

We focus on investor-state dispute settlement provisions contained in various, though far from all, bilateral investment treaties as a possible determinant of BIT-related effects on bilateral FDI flows. Our estimation results prove to be sensitive to the specification of these provisions as well as the inclusion of transition countries in the sample. Stricter dispute settlement provisions do not necessarily result in higher FDI inflows so that the effectiveness of BITs as a credible commitment device remains elusive.

Keywords: Dispute Settlement, BITs, FDI Flows

JEL Classification: F21, F23, K33

Suggested Citation

Berger, Axel and Busse, Matthias and Nunnenkamp, Peter and Roy, Martin, More Stringent BITs, Less Ambiguous Effects on FDI? Not a Bit! (April 1, 2010). Kiel Working Paper No. 1621. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1838653 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1838653

Axel Berger (Contact Author)

German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) ( email )

Tulpenfeld 6
Bonn, 53113
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.die-gdi.de

Matthias Busse

Ruhr-University Bochum ( email )

Faculty of Management and Economics, GC 3/145
D-44780 Bochum, DE 44780
Germany

HWWI - Hamburg Institute of International Economics

Heimhuder Str. 71
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

Peter Nunnenkamp

University of Kiel ( email )

D-24100 Kiel
Germany

Martin Roy

World Trade Organization (WTO) - Trade in Services Division ( email )

Centre William Rappard
Rue de Lausanne 154
12111 Geneva
Switzerland

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