Investor Protection and Corporate Governance

40 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2000

See all articles by Rafael La Porta

Rafael La Porta

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes

SKEMA Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Robert W. Vishny

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1999

Abstract

Recent research on corporate governance has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of financial markets, and in the access of firms to external finance. We suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, summarize the consequences of these differences, and suggest potential strategies of reform of corporate governance. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

La Porta, Rafael and Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance (June 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=183908 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.183908

Rafael La Porta (Contact Author)

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes

SKEMA Business School ( email )

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Lille, 59777
France

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Robert W. Vishny

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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United States
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312-702-0118 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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United States