Conditional Spatial Policy Dependence: Theory and Model Specification

Comparative Political Studies, 45 (7), 2012, pp. 819-849

43 Pages Posted: 31 May 2011 Last revised: 20 Jun 2012

See all articles by Eric Neumayer

Eric Neumayer

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Thomas Pluemper

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Socioeconomics; University of Essex - Department of Government

Date Written: May 13, 2011

Abstract

When the policy choice in one jurisdiction depends on those of other jurisdictions, then policies are said to be spatially dependent. In this article, we discuss how scholars can bring theories of spatial policy dependence and empirical model specifications closer in line so that the empirical analysis actually tests the theoretical predictions. Specifically, comprehensive theories of spatial policy dependence will typically suggest that the jurisdictions receiving spatial stimuli systematically differ in their exposure to such signals as a function of the intensity of their interaction with other jurisdictions. Similarly, theories will often predict that governments also differ in their responsiveness to any given spatial stimulus as a function of the institutional, political, economic or social context in which they operate. In other words, theories typically postulate that spatial dependence is conditional on exposure and responsiveness, neither of which is accounted for in the standard empirical practice of estimating one single common coefficient for a row-standardized spatial lag variable. We show how scholars can adequately model both forms of heterogeneity with properly specified interaction effects models.

Keywords: spatially dependent, spatial policy, policy choice

Suggested Citation

Neumayer, Eric and Plümper, Thomas, Conditional Spatial Policy Dependence: Theory and Model Specification (May 13, 2011). Comparative Political Studies, 45 (7), 2012, pp. 819-849. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1840589

Eric Neumayer (Contact Author)

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 207 955 7598 (Phone)
+44 207 955 7412 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/neumayer

Thomas Plümper

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Socioeconomics ( email )

Vienna
Austria

University of Essex - Department of Government ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.polsci.org/pluemper

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