Does Accuracy Improve the Information Value of Trials?

38 Pages Posted: 16 May 2011

See all articles by Anup Malani

Anup Malani

University of Chicago - Law School; University of Chicago Pritzker School of Medicine; Resources for the Future; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Scott Baker

Washington University in St. Louis - School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2011

Abstract

We develop a model where products liability trials provide information to consumers who are not parties to the litigation. Consumers use this information to take precautions against dangerous products. A critical assumption is that consumers cannot differentiate between firms that have never been sued and firms that have been sued but settled out of court. In this framework, we show that perfectly accurate courts do not maximize information to consumers and thus welfare, contrary to Kaplow and Shavell (1994). More accurate courts provide more information only if producers go to trial. Greater accuracy, however, encourages producers of dangerous products to settle and hide their type. When courts are perfectly accurate, all low quality producers settle. And given the lack of any information from trials about bad types, consumers (rationally) fail to take precautions. If consumer precautions are relatively more efficient than producer precautions, our conclusion stands even when firms can invest in improving the safety of their products.

Suggested Citation

Malani, Anup and Baker, Scott A., Does Accuracy Improve the Information Value of Trials? (May 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17036. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1841273

Anup Malani (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/malani/

University of Chicago Pritzker School of Medicine

Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Resources for the Future

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Scott A. Baker

Washington University in St. Louis - School of Law ( email )

Campus Box 1120
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

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