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Learning Games

Posted: 5 Nov 2011  

Nobuyuki Hanaki

Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS

Ryuichiro Ishikawa

Waseda University-SILS

Eizo Akiyama

University of Tsukuba - Department of Social Systems and Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May, 14 2011

Abstract

This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others. However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow learners.

Keywords: Learning, Subjective views, Computer simulation

JEL Classification: C72, D83

Suggested Citation

Hanaki, Nobuyuki and Ishikawa, Ryuichiro and Akiyama, Eizo, Learning Games (May, 14 2011). Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 33, No. 10, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1841571

Nobuyuki Hanaki (Contact Author)

Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS ( email )

GREQAM
3 Ave Robert Schuman
Aix-en-Provence, 13628
France

Ryuichiro Ishikawa

Waseda University-SILS ( email )

Shinjuku, Tokyo 1658050
Japan

HOME PAGE: http://www.f.waseda.jp/r.ishikawa/

Eizo Akiyama

University of Tsukuba - Department of Social Systems and Management ( email )

Japan

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