Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private Providers of Public Goods?

Centre for Historical Economics and Related Research at York (CHERRY) Discussion Paper

50 Pages Posted: 16 May 2011

See all articles by Mark Koyama

Mark Koyama

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: May 1, 2011

Abstract

In early 19th century England there was no professional police force and most prosecutions were private. This paper examines how associations for the prosecution of felons arose to internalise the positive externalities produced by private prosecutions. Drawing upon new historical evidence, it examines how the internal governance and incentive structures of prosecution associations enabled them to provide public goods. Consistent with Demsetz (1970), prosecution associations were economic clubs that bundled the private good of insurance with the public good of deterrence. Associations used local newspapers to advertise rewards and attract new members. Price discrimination was employed in order to elicit contributions from individuals with different security demands. Selective incentives helped overcome to free-rider problems between members.

Keywords: public goods, private prosecutions. insurance. selective incentives

JEL Classification: N43, K42

Suggested Citation

Koyama, Mark, Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private Providers of Public Goods? (May 1, 2011). Centre for Historical Economics and Related Research at York (CHERRY) Discussion Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1842148 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1842148

Mark Koyama (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~mkoyama2/About.html

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

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