Gender and Negotiation in the Small: Are Women (Perceived to Be) More Cooperative than Men?

Negotiation Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 429-445, 2008

17 Pages Posted: 17 May 2011

See all articles by Catherine C. Eckel

Catherine C. Eckel

Texas A&M University

Angela C. M. de Oliveira

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Philip J. Grossman

Monash University - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 1, 2008

Abstract

We surveyed research by experimental economists that examines gender differences in negotiation in the context of two simple, two-player games. Our purpose is to uncover empirical regularities in the results that might be useful to teachers or practitioners of negotiation. In the dictator game, one player unilaterally determines the division of a fixed amount of money. In the ultimatum game, one player offers a division and the other must accept or reject that offer; if rejected, both players receive a zero payoff. The results have shown that, on balance, women tend to be more egalitarian than men, to expect and ask for less in the negotiation. Women also seem to be more responsive to the context of a negotiation and are less likely to fail to reach an agreement than men. These differences are small, however, in comparison with differences in expectations about what women and men will do. We conclude that stereotyping is alive and well in negotiations and that this can help or hinder negotiation outcomes, depending on the context.

Keywords: negotiation, gender, dictator game, ultimatum game, experimental economics

Suggested Citation

Eckel, Catherine C. and de Oliveira, Angela C. M. and Grossman, Philip J., Gender and Negotiation in the Small: Are Women (Perceived to Be) More Cooperative than Men? (October 1, 2008). Negotiation Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 429-445, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1843338

Catherine C. Eckel (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University ( email )

5201 University Blvd.
College Station, TX 77843-4228
United States

Angela C. M. De Oliveira

University of Massachusetts Amherst ( email )

Department of Operations and Information Managemen
Amherst, MA 01003
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.umass.edu/resec/faculty/deoliveira/index.shtml

Philip J. Grossman

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Wellington Road
Clayton, 3800
Australia
61399020052 (Phone)

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