Fairness and Rejections in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game

Political Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 376-393, 2002

18 Pages Posted: 17 May 2011

See all articles by Catherine C. Eckel

Catherine C. Eckel

Texas A&M University

Rick K. Wilson

Rice University - Department of Political Science

Martin Johnson

University of California, Riverside - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2002

Abstract

The ultimatum game is a standard instrument for laboratory experimentalists. It had been replicated in a large number of environments and points to special considerations for fairness. Although it has been popular in the experimental community, researchers have not harnessed all the statistical power they should to evaluate the dynamics at work in this type of a bargaining game. This research uses two planned treatments, the first involving a signaling condition concerning a subject's "type," and the second a price effect built into the structure of the game. We find that there are no significant main effects as a result of the signaling condition of a subject's type, but that there are strong effects as a result of the different payoff parameters. Using a variety of multivariate models we find important, non-obvious interactions with the gender of the subjects. The lesson that we take away from this research is that experimentalists can learn more from data collected in the tightly controlled laboratory environment by using statistical techniques that complement their research designs.

Suggested Citation

Eckel, Catherine C. and Wilson, Rick K. and Johnson, Martin, Fairness and Rejections in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game (2002). Political Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 376-393, 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1843506

Catherine C. Eckel (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University ( email )

5201 University Blvd.
College Station, TX 77843-4228
United States

Rick K. Wilson

Rice University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

Martin Johnson

University of California, Riverside - Department of Political Science ( email )

Riverside, CA 92521
United States

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