Asymmetric Obligations

33 Pages Posted: 18 May 2011

See all articles by Nadine Riedel

Nadine Riedel

Oxford University CBT; University of Hohenheim

Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch

Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: May 17, 2011

Abstract

We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding deterrent incentives. To implement such ‘expressive law’ we introduce different levels of very weakly incentivized, symmetric and asymmetric minimum contribution levels (obligations) in a repeated public goods experiment. The results provide evidence for a weak expressive function of law: while the initial impact of high obligations on behavior is strong, it decreases over time. Asymmetric obligations are as effective as symmetric ones. Our results are compatible with the argument that expressive law affects behavior by attaching an emotional cost of disobeying the own obligation.

Keywords: non-binding obligations, expressive law, public goods, experiment

JEL Classification: C920, H410, K400

Suggested Citation

Riedel, Nadine and Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah, Asymmetric Obligations (May 17, 2011). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3450, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1844106 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1844106

Nadine Riedel (Contact Author)

Oxford University CBT ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 1HP
United Kingdom

University of Hohenheim ( email )

Stuttgart
Germany

Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch

Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf ( email )

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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