The Absence of 'Order Effects' in Dynamic Tournaments: Evidence from a Real-Life Randomized Experiment

24 Pages Posted: 18 May 2011

See all articles by Frank Mueller-Langer

Frank Mueller-Langer

University of the Bundeswehr Munich; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; European Commission, Joint Research Center

Patrick Andreoli Versbach

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics

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Date Written: May 18, 2011

Abstract

Many tournaments consist of multiple stages under asymmetric conditions. We analyze the efficiency of tournaments in which the order of a temporary advantage is randomly allocated by the tournament regulation. We find that the order in which the players have this advantage does not have an effect on the probability of winning the tournament. We then test the predictions of the model by using a randomized natural experiment in professional sports competitions. The setting is the two-leg knock-out structure in soccer tournaments where two teams are randomly allocated to have an advantage (to play at home) either in the Â…first or the second stage of the competition. In contrast to the previous literature that provides evidence for a first-mover advantage due to preemptive behavior, we find no support for the proposition that the winning probability in dynamic tournaments depends on the order of advantages.

Keywords: Tournaments, order effects, randomized natural experiments

Suggested Citation

Mueller-Langer, Frank and Andreoli Versbach, Patrick, The Absence of 'Order Effects' in Dynamic Tournaments: Evidence from a Real-Life Randomized Experiment (May 18, 2011). Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 11- 08, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1845279 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1845279

Frank Mueller-Langer (Contact Author)

University of the Bundeswehr Munich ( email )

Munich
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Munich
Germany

European Commission, Joint Research Center

Seville
Spain

Patrick Andreoli Versbach

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

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